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The next development in building Bayesian networks will most likely entail constructing
multi-purpose models that can be employed for varying tasks and by different types of
user. In this position paper, we argue that the development of a special type of ontology
to organize the knowledge involved in such a multi-purpose model is crucial for the man-
agement of the model’s content. This ontology should preserve all knowledge elicited for
the construction of the model and be accessible to domain experts and knowledge engi-
neers alike. Based on the different ways in which people learn and gain expertise, we fur-
ther argue that knowledge elicitation will result in task-speciﬁc knowledge mostly, which
is best stored in the format in which it is elicited. To support varying model views for dif-
ferent tasks and different types of user, we propose that the elicited knowledge be orga-
nized in a library-style ontology of separate modules.
 2009 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
While in the early years of the ﬁeld of Bayesian networks attention focused primarily on algorithmic issues, the last dec-
ade has seen an increasing interest in methods to support the construction of such networks. The ﬁeld also has become more
and more experienced in building decision-support systems that include a Bayesian network. Bayesian networks by now
have evolved beyond laboratory settings and are being employed by non-academic users. In turn, users of these network-
based decision-support systems are starting to see the possibilities that these systems offer, and begin to ask for more.
For some of our biomedical diagnostic applications for example, we have been asked whether we could perhaps adapt
the model for teaching purposes. It is therefore likely that the next development in the ﬁeld of Bayesian networks will entail
building multi-purpose models which can be employed for different tasks and, in all likelihood, by different types of user.
In this paper we argue that to support model views for varying tasks, a suite of Bayesian networks should be built rather
than a single uniﬁed network. We further argue that in the ﬁrst step of developing such a suite, knowledge elicitation will
necessarily result in task-speciﬁc information mostly, although also some task-neutral knowledge may emerge. Organizing
the elicited knowledge into a library-style ontology of multiple task-speciﬁc and task-neutral modules, is then best suited to
empower reuse of knowledge segments and to facilitate ready composition of model views. We also reiterate our view that
this ontology should capture all elicited knowledge and be accessible to both domain experts and engineers.
We begin by deﬁning different types of model view in Section 2, and outline the task model view under discussion in the
current paper. We argue that a uniﬁed multi-purpose model for a range of tasks would quickly become too large and unwiel-
dy to afford the knowledge engineers and the domain experts an overview of its contents. For one of our moderately-sized
single-purpose networks in the biomedical ﬁeld, for example, we noticed already that an experienced knowledge engineer
who was new to the application, was not quite able to gain an overview of the network’s contents without considerable help
from the engineer who had originally constructed the network and its associated documentation. Since having a cleary Elsevier Inc.
ag), hermi@cs.uu.nl (H.J.M. Tabachneck-Schijf).
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lihood, smaller models, rather than a single Bayesian network.
In Section 3 we outline our view of ontologies for suites of Bayesian networks. We rationalize why an ontology should be
constructed of the elicited knowledge, before actually developing the suite. Our ontology provides an unambiguous and
well-structured documentation of all elicited knowledge and thus includes not just the knowledge that is explicitly captured
in the suite’s models but also any background and meta-level information that remains implicit in the suite. The latter types
of information support, for example, viewing the elicited knowledge from different perspectives as required for developing
different task views, and are likely to be instrumental in lessening future elicitation efforts for new views which may not
have been foreseen at the suite’s initial construction. The ontology, moreover, is enhanced with information to support fu-
ture modeling efforts for such views. Note that our view of ontologies for suites of Bayesian networks thus is more compre-
hensive than current views of ontologies for knowledge-based systems in general. Our rationalization in Section 3 is much in
line with our earlier arguments for developing ontologies for single, task-speciﬁc networks [15]. Our experiences with devel-
oping ontologies for single-model applications in the biomedical ﬁeld moreover emphasize the importance of rich documen-
tation, not just for constructing the model but also for its use and maintenance over a longer period of time [18].
We are not the ﬁrst to suggest the use of ontologies. Ontologies are being developed for a variety of purposes, ranging
from providing a portal for access to the semantic web, to documenting elicited knowledge for the development of knowl-
edge-based systems in general, see for example [5,12,14,31]. For many of these purposes, a rigorously formal, logic-based or
other mathematical ontology language is used to allow automated processing. For our purpose of supporting the develop-
ment and maintenance of a suite of networks by well-structured documentation however, the ontology should primarily
provide a medium for communication between the engineers and the experts involved in the suite’s construction. Having
experienced that a rigorously formal language is not easily accessed by non-mathematical experts, we advocate, in Section
3, the use of a less formal language for our ontologies. One of the commonly-acknowledged drawbacks of using informal lan-
guages for documentation is that they do not allow automated processing. For our single-purpose Bayesian networks, how-
ever, we currently are gaining experience with developing ontologies using semi-formal representations which do allow
automated processing to at least some extent [16].
In Section 4, we address the knowledge content of our comprehensive ontologies for suites of Bayesian networks. In order
to align the content of the ontologies with elicited knowledge, we consider the processes by which humans learn and struc-
ture their own knowledge. We argue that the professional knowledge of practicing experts is mostly both task- and domain-
speciﬁc, although also some task-neutral information may emerge during knowledge elicitation. In Section 5, we argue that
the elicited knowledge is best stored in the form in which it is obtained, if only to forestall, as much as possible, the intro-
duction of biases by the knowledge engineers involved. We further propose that the elicited knowledge be organized into
separate modules to support use of segments of the knowledge in the construction of the suite’s models and of their asso-
ciated task model views. Organizing the modules in a library-style ontology further encourages re-use of knowledge seg-
ments when the suite is being extended to cover new tasks.
Considering semi-automated processing and modularizing knowledge, we would like to note that in our earlier work we
propagated the evolution of a meta-library of generic knowledge structures [16]. An example of such a generic structure for
the biomedical ﬁeld captures all domain-independent knowledge that plays a role in relating test results to their underlying
true value [17]. To exploit such a structure, the knowledge engineer instantiates it with domain-speciﬁc knowledge and uses
the instantiated structure for semi-automated design of a segment of the Bayesian network under construction. Note that
while this meta-library of generic structures includes only knowledge which is domain-independent and preferably task-
neutral, the library-style ontology proposed in the current paper is tailored to a particular domain and to multiple speciﬁc
tasks within this domain. The availability of a meta-library of generic structures would nonetheless support the construction
of an ontology for a suite of Bayesian networks as proposed here.
The paper ends with a discussion and some perspectives for further elaboration of the presented ideas to a practicable
knowledge-engineering approach to developing multi-purpose suites of Bayesian networks.2. Model views of Bayesian networks
We distinguish two types of model view for a suite of Bayesian networks, namely task model views and interaction model
views. To explain the difference between these two types of view, we distinguish three products delivered in the develop-
ment of a suite of networks and review the steps to render them. We illustrate these products and steps by describing
the development of a suite of models in the example domain of oesophageal cancer. Future users of the projected suite
are attending oncologists, whom the suite should assist in staging their patients’ cancers [10], and students, whom the suite
should support by simulating tumor growth and explaining the consequences involved for a patient; a third group of pro-
spective users are the engineers who are responsible for debugging and maintaining the suite.
The ﬁrst product in the development of a suite of models consists of a stored pool of knowledge relevant to all tasks to be
carried out with the suite. For the example domain, the pool should contain knowledge about relating the results of diag-
nostic tests to a stage of the cancer, as well as pathophysiological knowledge about how an oesophageal tumor invades,
for example, blood vessels and thereby gives rise to secondary tumors distant from the oesophagus. The second product
encompasses the actual suite of networks that allows computations to be carried out for the various tasks. For the domain
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diagnostic tests and one for simulating and explaining tumor growth. Note that these two models would differ, at least,
in the amount of detail modeled: for example, while the network for the students would model the exact process by which
cancer cells are conveyed through the blood vessels, the network for the oncologists would leave this process implicit, relat-
ing the presence of distant secondary tumors directly to a speciﬁc stage of the tumor’s growth. The third product in the
development of a suite of models comprises the interfaces, which are the concrete means that allow users to work with
the suite. To allow an attending oncologist to consult the example suite of models, an interface closely resembling a patient’s
status would sufﬁce, in which the test results obtained can be readily ﬁlled in; for the students, the addition of a more elab-
orate interface would be required, showing anatomical pictures, animations of tumor growth over time, and options for pos-
ing deeper ‘why’ and ‘what if’ questions.
In view of the three products outlined above, we brieﬂy consider the steps that need to be taken to render them. The ﬁrst
step, leading to the ﬁrst product, involves eliciting, structuring and organizing knowledge. The second step amounts to ﬁrst
selecting, from the pool of elicited knowledge, the knowledge that is going to determine the content and the structure of
each of the models in the projected suite; the selected knowledge then is delimited in scope for example by making contex-
tual assumptions, and subsequently represented in the mathematical formalism of Bayesian networks. This second step
delivers the actual suite of models. The ﬁnal step is characterized by designing interfaces to the suite, that is, the different
ways the models can be presented to someone interacting with it, be this an engineer or an end-user focused on a speciﬁc
domain task.
We consider a task model view to be one view of a suite of models. The task model view is the result of carrying out the
elicitation and structuring of task-neutral and task-related domain knowledge and of making selections of the elicited
knowledge to support a single or a few closely related tasks. For our example suite of models, one task model view might
support the diagnostic reasoning task of an attending oncologist which includes the staging of his patient’s cancer, while
another task model view could support learning to understand the progression of cancer of the oesophagus. Note that these
different task model views dictate different levels of modeling detail and, in fact, require different knowledge contents of the
task-speciﬁc models in the suite. Interaction model views, on the other hand, comprise the interfaces of the suite that are tai-
lored to task and user. For the diagnostics model view in our domain, for example, two interaction model views would be
developed: one interaction model view could be optimized for data entry by an attending oncologist, and another might sup-
port maintenance of the model by the knowledge engineer.
To summarize, for different tasks to be carried out by different types of user, a suite of models can require several task
model views, each of which can need several interaction model views. In an earlier paper, we laid out some methods to con-
struct effective interaction model views for a single-purpose Bayesian network [28]. In the current paper, we concentrate on
the elicitation, structuring and organization of domain knowledge to support the development of multiple task model views
with a suite of networks.3. Ontologies for Bayesian networks
A suite of Bayesian networks that supports several tasks in an application domain by different task model views, is very
likely to be of a complexity necessitating development over multiple years, involving possibly different engineers and ex-
perts. Building and maintaining models of such complexity is a hard and time-consuming process. The expert knowledge
elicited in the process constitutes a rich pool of information, segments of which can play different roles in the various tasks
in the domain at hand. All this knowledge has to be carefully reviewed and structured, and ultimately captured in the for-
malism of Bayesian networks. In this process, a multitude of modeling decisions are taken as well as numerous decisions to
demarcate the scope of the model. Such decisions tend to forestall an overview and thorough comprehension of the model by
anyone who has not been intimately involved in its construction. We have experienced that construction and maintenance of
large, uniﬁed networks are already seriously hampered if the elicited domain knowledge and the decisions taken are not
made explicit by rich documentation [18]. This problem is bound to grow worse if a suite of networks rather than a single
network is to be developed and maintained.
Having observed, in our earlier work, the advantages of developing an ontology for an application domain before actually
building a network [15], we feel that the construction of a suite of models will especially beneﬁt from an explicit, compre-
hensive ontology, which then serves not just as a documentation of all elicited knowledge but also, for example, as a means
of ensuring consistency over the models within the suite and as a medium for communication between the experts and engi-
neers involved. In this section, we discuss the varying roles of such an ontology in the construction and maintenance of the
suite. We further address the language to be used for the ontology and argue that a properly developed ontology provides a
scaffolding for semi-automated construction of network segments.
3.1. The roles of our ontologies
To support building and maintaining knowledge-based systems in general, sophisticated knowledge-engineering meth-
odologies have been developed; among these is the well known and commonly employed CommonKADS methodology [25].
Most of these generally applicable knowledge-engineering approaches strongly recommend the development of a concep-
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be used. Underlying this recommendation is the observation that capturing knowledge directly in the projected formalism
may result in a representation in which the domain knowledge is not easily recognizable as a result of the modeling deci-
sions taken. First developing a separate conceptual model may thus prevent unwarranted discrepancies between the elicited
domain knowledge and its representation, which otherwise could adversely inﬂuence the system’s contents and hamper its
maintenance. In line with this generally accepted recommendation to ﬁrst develop a conceptual model, we recently pro-
posed to have this conceptual model be an ontology [15].
There exist many views of the concept of ontology in general; for a variety of views, see [5,12,14,31]. In this paper, we use
the term ontology to refer to an explicit speciﬁcation of the elicited domain knowledge that is to be shared by the experts
and the knowledge engineers involved in the construction and maintenance of a suite of Bayesian networks; the speciﬁca-
tion moreover is enriched with modeling information to support engineering of the suite. Ontologies for knowledge-sharing
purposes have been studied extensively, both in theory [13] and in a more practical setting [14]. From this research, a num-
ber of criteria emerged for their construction and use. These criteria stress for example the importance of achieving clarity of
the concepts and relations captured in the ontology to both knowledge engineers and domain experts, and of maintaining
internal coherence and extendability. The criterion of minimal encoding bias in addition posits that the representation lan-
guage to be used in the ontology should introduce as little bias as possible in the contents and structure of the elicited
knowledge. Another often postulated criterion is the criterion of minimal ontological commitment, which states that the
ontology should be developed independently of the projected use of the ontology and its contents, and hence be task-neutral.
This criterion originates from the observation that any commitment for example to the problem-solving method that will be
applied to the domain knowledge, will inﬂuence and thereby possibly bias the knowledge captured in the ontology [4]. In the
remainder of this paper, we adopt most of these criteria; in Section 4 however, we will rationalize why we will not adopt the
criterion of minimal ontological commitment just like that.
Ontologies developed for the purpose of knowledge sharing play multiple distinct roles in the construction of a suite of
Bayesian networks. One of these roles is to make all elicited domain knowledge explicit. To this end, the ontology speciﬁes
not just the knowledge that is to be captured explicitly in at least one of the networks, but also the relevant background
knowledge of the domain that will remain implicit in the suite and the meta-level knowledge of its regularities and organi-
zational structure. While all intricacies of the domain should be captured in the ontology to achieve clarity, that is, to avoid
multiple interpretations and lack of understanding, details should also be hidden by including meta-level information about
the structure of the knowledge to preserve understandability and transparency on an overview level. A second prominent
role of our ontology is to provide an explicit medium for communication between domain experts and engineers. The con-
tents of the ontology should thus be unambiguously understood and agreed upon by all agents involved [31], allowing them
to communicate about the domain knowledge without any misconceptions when building, evaluating and maintaining the
suite of networks. We return to these two roles of our ontologies in Section 3.2. Another important role of ontologies de-
signed as rich documentations of elicited knowledge, is to scaffold the construction of the projected suite of networks. Since
the ontology includes all ingredients to be modeled in the networks, it essentially allows a process of semi-automated con-
struction in which the knowledge engineer selects and pre-processes ontology segments which subsequently are translated
into network segments for further processing; we return to this idea of semi-automated construction of networks from our
ontologies in Section 3.3.
3.2. The language of our ontologies
The representation language used for capturing and organizing elicited domain knowledge inﬂuences the extent to which
our ontologies can meet the various roles outlined above. The issue of selecting an appropriate language has been addressed
by many researchers: some suggest that domain knowledge should be represented in natural language or in a language that
is semi-informal [31], yet others argue that ontologies should be speciﬁed in a rigorously formal language and, in fact, should
be machine readable [26].
An important argument for using a mathematically formal ontology language is that it allows a highly structured and
unambiguous representation of the elicited knowledge. Such a formal representation in turn is likely to allow (semi-)auto-
mated derivation of segments of the Bayesian networks under construction. Rigorously formal languages often have limited
expressiveness however, as is evidenced for example by the many attempts to extend ﬁrst-order predicate logic to allow
modeling of speciﬁc knowledge constructs. In our view, it is important that an ontology language should come with a rich
semantics to introduce as little bias as possible in the represented contents. If the language would introduce biases, then the
resulting ontology might not properly reﬂect the intricacies of the domain. Since the ontology is used for the construction of
a network, the resulting model might then be biased as well, possibly in unforeseen ways. The development of an indepen-
dent knowledge model recommended by most knowledge-engineering methodologies in fact, has its origin in this
observation.
While the possibility of automated processing favors using a rigorously formal ontology language, the purpose of knowl-
edge sharing provides a strong argument for using a less formal one. Since the contents of the ontology should be unambig-
uously understood by both the knowledge engineers and the domain experts involved in a suite’s construction, it should be
represented in a language that is understandable for all. The language of Bayesian networks is often considered suitable for
this purpose: many argue that the graphical structures which capture the qualitative domain knowledge are intuitively
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are not familiar with the Bayesian-network language nor with the concept of probabilistic independence, tend to misinter-
pret the graphical structure [11,28]. For example, a medical diagnostic network will typically contain arcs from a disease to
its various symptoms. A physician, however, may be inclined to reverse these arcs, since upon establishing a diagnosis for a
patient reasoning typically goes from observed symptoms to disease. Yet, a network containing the reversed arcs may not
correctly represent the independences that hold in the domain of application. In our opinion, many of the formal languages
commonly used for ontologies are unsuitable for checking accumulated knowledge with non-mathematical experts. If the
use of a formal language is uncommon in a domain of application, then a rigorously formal language is unsuited for the pur-
pose of knowledge sharing between the knowledge engineers and the domain’s experts, and a less formal language had best
be used.
For developing single-purpose Bayesian networks in the biomedical domain, we are currently gaining experience with a
semi-formal ontology language composed of well-structured tables, depictions, graphs and hierarchy representations com-
bined with text [15], which can be understood by both domain experts and knowledge engineers and allow automated pro-
cessing to at least some extent. As an example, Fig. 1a shows part of the ontology that we developed for the domain of
oesophageal cancer. The depicted graphical structure captures knowledge about the relationship between the result of a gas-
troscopic examination of the circumference of a patient’s tumor and the underlying true circumference. Each node in the
structure depicts a particular state; this state reﬂects a situation, in time, in which a property of an object or process has
adopted a value. The top leftmost node in the depicted structure, for example, models the true circumference of the oesoph-
ageal tumor of a particular patient; the bottom leftmost node captures the degree to which the swallowing capabilities of the
patient are impaired. Labeled arcs are used to denote relations between the modeled states; associated with the arc is a table
which details the relation in terms of the values of the related states. In our ontology language, different types of relation are
deﬁned. Fig. 1a includes, for example, inducing relations and enabling relations. An inducing relation asserts that a particular
state may induce another state; this relation involves time in the sense that the induced state cannot occur before the induc-
ing state has occurred, yet leaves implicit the process by which the latter state induces the former one. The inducing relation
between the two leftmost nodes in the depicted structure, for example, expresses that the circumference of a patient’s
oesophageal tumor may induce an impairment of the patient’s swallowing capabilities; the table associated with the labeled
arc (not shown in the ﬁgure) further details the relation by describing that the larger the circumference is, the higher the
degree of impairment will be. An enabling relation differs from an inducing relation in that it links a state to a relation rather
than to another state; it expresses that the enabling state must occur before the enabled relation can take effect. The en-
abling relations in the left part of Fig. 1a, for example, express that a gastroscopic examination of the patient’s oesophagus
can result in an image from which the tumor’s circumference can be established, only if two conditions are met: the patient’s
swallowing capabilities should not be too seriously impaired and the laboratory technician should have sufﬁcient skill in
performing the gastroscopy.
The entire oesophageal cancer ontology includes not just the knowledge involved in interpreting the result of a gastro-
scopic examination of the circumference of a patient’s primary tumor, but also the knowledge involved in relating the resultsenabling
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Fig. 1. Relations between test results and the underlying true values, (a) for a gastroscopic examination of the circumference of an oesophageal tumor, and
(b) for a diagnostic test in oncology in general.
L.C. van der Gaag, H.J.M. Tabachneck-Schijf / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 196–208 201from various other diagnostic tests to their true underlying values. In addition to the knowledge pertaining to these tests
separately, the ontology speciﬁes the high-level regularities in the knowledge involved. The graphical structure capturing
these regularities is depicted in Fig. 1b. The leftmost part of the structure, for example, expresses that the tested property
may induce a manifestation; this manifestation may enable, possibly negatively, the performance of the test involved, which
in turn may enable, again perhaps negatively, the test to yield a result. In our earlier research, we already argued that these
high-level regularities can be exploited upon extending the network with the results of new tests, which might not have
been foreseen at the network’s inception: the high-level graph shows which knowledge may be involved and can thereby
provide guidance for the elicitation of knowledge pertaining to the new tests. The high-level graph in addition is instrumen-
tal in maintaining internal coherence and consistency of the captured knowledge in that it serves to draw attention to any
deviations of the newly added knowledge from the regularities that are present in the already included knowledge.
For further details of our ontology language and of the oesophageal cancer ontology more speciﬁcally, we refer the reader
to [18].
3.3. Ontology-supported construction of networks
Upon building a suite of Bayesian networks for an application domain, it is a daunting prospect to have to capture all elic-
ited knowledge in two ways, that is, ﬁrst in a comprehensive ontology and then in actual networks. A carefully structured
ontology, however, can be used to derive the networks’ graphical structures in a semi-automated fashion. We brieﬂy sketch
such semi-automated construction; for further details, we refer the reader to [16].
Deriving probabilistic graphical structures from an ontology is done by a sequence of steps, some of which need be per-
formed by a knowledge engineer and some of which can be supported by automated processing. First, the knowledge that is
to be captured in a projected network needs to be selected. This ﬁrst step involves a careful review of the elicited knowledge
and must necessarily be performed and documented by the knowledge engineer. In the next step, the states and relations
from the selected parts of the ontology are combined into a single graphical structure. Automated processing can to some
extent support the knowledge engineer in performing this step. The resulting structure in essence describes all knowledge
that needs to be captured in the projected network, but is not yet stated in the language of Bayesian networks: the structure
may for example include enabling relations which link a node to a relation rather than to another node as would be required
for a Bayesian network. We observe, however, that the structure states the selected knowledge in terms of properties of ob-
jects or processes. Since such properties typically play the role of variables in the application domain, the structure provides
a convenient point of departure for deriving an initial network structure.
For deriving a probabilistic graphical structure, ﬁrst the properties from the ontology’s structure are translated into sto-
chastic variables. From the example structure of Fig. 1a for example, the degree to which a patient’s swallowing capabilities
are impaired, is translated directly into a stochastic variable for the Bayesian network under construction. Since translating
properties into stochastic variables may involve re-deﬁning some of the concepts involved, this step is performed by the
knowledge engineer, possibly supported by software. The next step is to specify the arcs for the network’s graphical structure.
Since the relations in the ontology’s structure capture (mostly) directional inﬂuences between the modeled properties, these
relations can be translated more or less directly into arcs. Enabling relations, however, cannot be translated in this way, since
the language of Bayesian networks does not allow arcs pointing to other arcs. We now observe that enabling relations essen-
tially are indirect inﬂuences. In Fig. 1(a), for example, the two enabling relations in the leftmost part of the structure link an
impaired passage of food to whether or not a gastroscopic examinationwill yield an appropriate image, and can thus be trans-
lated in an arc from the stochastic variable modeling the degree of passage impairment to the variable capturing the gastro-
scopic image. The steps involved in the translation of relations from the ontology’s structure to arcs in the probabilistic
graphical structure can be performed in an automated way. The graphical structure resulting from this step is stated in the
language of Bayesian networks, but is not guaranteed to properly reﬂect the independences holding in the application domain.
In the ﬁnal step of the derivation, therefore, the engineer has tometiculously verify that the structure correctly captures prob-
abilistic independence. Also, the structure may need some optimization, for example for reducing the burden of probability
elicitation. Fig. 2 shows the probabilistic graphical structure thatmay thus be derived from the ontological structure of Fig. 1a.
4. Eliciting ontology knowledge
Given the prospective advantages of constructing a comprehensive ontology before actually building a suite of Bayesian
networks, we now turn to the question of how to organize the elicited knowledge in the ontology so that it most usefully
supports different task model views for the suite.Gastro-image-
Test-skills
circumf Gastro-circumf
Interpretation-skillsPassage
Circumference
Fig. 2. The initially derived probabilistic graphical structure.
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contents, that is, many researchers advocate minimizing ontological commitment; see for example [4]. As already mentioned
in Section 3, underlying this recommendation is the argument that any commitment to for example the problem-solving
method to be applied may bias the contents of the ontology, and may thereby hamper its extendability and re-use. Con-
structing an ontology without any commitments to a particular task however, requires either eliciting task-neutral knowl-
edge from domain experts, or stripping the task-speciﬁc aspects from the elicited knowledge. In this section, we address the
feasibility of the ﬁrst option; the second option is brieﬂy addressed in Section 5.
We consider eliciting task-neutral information, that is, eliciting knowledge from experts without them having a particular
task in mind. To provide task-neutral information, experts should be able to gather such information from their minds, which
implies that the knowledge should be stored in their brains in such a way that task-neutral aspects are readily separated
from task-speciﬁc aspects. We brieﬂy lay out the different ways in which people learn information, and argue that these
learning processes imply that the knowledge stored in the human brain is largely both domain- and task-speciﬁc. We then
conclude that, given how knowledge is learned and stored, it would be extremely difﬁcult to elicit task-neutral knowledge
from an experienced professional.
4.1. Human knowledge acquisition processes
Humans in general, and hence professionals as well, gather knowledge over their entire lifetime, not just during periods of
formal education. Many publications in the social sciences attest to the importance of learning outside of formal education:
incidental, experiential, non-formal, informal and on-the-job learning are some of the terms used to describe this type of
learning, see for example [1,9,22]. The deﬁnitions for this type of learning all differ, but they have in common that the learn-
ing occurs in a natural setting, be that farming in Senegal [23], college teaching in the Netherlands [7], or a childhood home.
Learning in a natural setting can be intentional, in the sense that the learner is actively trying to learn something. Such learn-
ing occurs, for example, through an apprenticeship or by modeling, that is, purposely attending to how an expert performs a
task with the intention to copy the skills. The learner can also acquire knowledge incidentally, having no intention to learn.
This type of learning occurs very frequently: a child, for example, picks up seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling skills
in order to make sense of ambient information, and learns to interact with its environment by movements, language and
social skills, all without any formal teaching or any intention to learn. A physician similarly picks up medical knowledge
and professional social skills while practicing medicine. Intentional and incidental non-formal learning share the fact that
knowledge is acquired in the context of performing tasks in a natural setting, which usually is much richer than the setting
provided in formal eduction. Early research has already shown that incidental learning does not necessarily have to result in
less knowledge than intentional learning [19].
Emphasizing the omnipresence of non-formal learning and the importance of the setting in which the learning occurs, a
uniﬁed view of learning was popularized in the late 1990s [32]. Although this view of learning may not be a mainstream
learning theory, we feel that it provides a useful way to think about how and when what type of knowledge is acquired
by humans in general. To support our rationalization of why it will be difﬁcult to elicit task-neutral knowledge from expe-
rienced professionals, we therefore brieﬂy describe this uniﬁed learning view.
In the uniﬁed view of learning, knowledge gathering is divided into four categories: transmission, acquisition, accretion,
and emergence. The four learning processes are summarized in Fig. 3; the left part of the ﬁgure describes which learningFig. 3. Knowledge gathered by the four different learning processes.
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four processes. When people are asked to describe learning processes, they generally only mention the intentional processes
of transmission and acquisition. We therefore describe these two processes ﬁrst. Knowledge gathered during formal education
from books and teachers is explicitly transmitted, that is, teachers tell their students what to read and do when, and provide
explanations and scaffolding so that the students are encouraged to store the knowledge in their brains. Language and math-
ematical skills are examples of such transmitted knowledge. Note that these skills are not speciﬁc to a particular task. In fact,
transmitted knowledge is often purposely task-neutral. In transmission learning, the knowledge is intentionally offered, but
the amount that actually ends up in the brain depends highly on the student. The learning view estimates that over the
course of a lifetime transmission accounts for only some 10% of the knowledge of an average person [32].
Further intentional learning is acquisition learning, which is estimated to be good for some 20% of a person’s knowledge.
Acquired knowledge is gathered by the learner’s own initiative: by exploring, experimenting, self-instruction, inquiry, inten-
tional modeling and the like; this type of learning has also been termed active learning or inquiry-based learning [27,30].
Because acquired knowledge is gathered by the learner’s initiative, the chance that it will actually end up in the brain is high-
er than for transmitted knowledge, where the learner may or may not be interested enough to store the knowledge. Whether
acquired knowledge is task-neutral or task- and domain-speciﬁc depends on the setting in which it is gathered. If the knowl-
edge is acquired within the formal education process, it may still be partly task-neutral; if it is gathered in a natural setting, it
will most certainly be task- and domain-speciﬁc, because it will be embedded in and driven by the demands of the setting.
When asked to distinguish between different learning processes, people may perhaps mention emergence in addition to
transmission and acquisition learning; the fourth type of learning, called accretion, does not commonly come to mind how-
ever. Yet, while emergence is estimated to account for only some 1–2% of the knowledge of an average person, accretion is
estimated to account for as much as 70% of what a person knows [32]. Although emergence is relatively rare, it is important
for example in pushing science ahead: it is the result of self-constructing new ideas and meanings that did not exist before.
While accounting for most of what is stored in a person’s brain, accretion is often not thought of as learning: it is the gradual,
often subconscious, process by which we learn for example social rules and behaviors [32]. Accreted skills are typically
learned without the mediation of language and are picked up just by sensing and processing information and by acting in
and reacting to sensed information in a natural setting. Accretion, however, is not just about the large amounts of information
that are unconsciously being processed, it is also about information that may be consciously processed but is not intentionally
learned. Just by processing encountered information, a trace of it is stored in the brain. As with all learned information, the
setting in which the information was learned is stored with it. Accreted knowledge is used intensively: it is triggered, or rec-
ognized, every time a situation is experienced that contains enough aspects that are similar to the one the information was
learned in. The fact that much accreted knowledge is not available on demand, meaning that we cannot readily activate it by
conscious effort, does notmake it any less powerful or important. The unconscious processing system in fact has amuch high-
er processing capacity than the conscious system [6]. Current research even shows it to be better to only use unconscious
thought when making complex decisions, as the limited capacity of conscious thought leads us to focus on subsets of infor-
mation which quite often are not optimal [6,24]. It follows from the above that because accreted knowledge is generally
picked up and triggered within rich natural settings, it is largely both task- and domain-speciﬁc.
4.2. Example: the acquisition of medical knowledge
While the four processes reviewed above relate to general learning practices, they are easily mapped onto what happens
in the course of gathering professional knowledge. Although the exact percentages may vary somewhat for experienced pro-
fessionals, the four processes will create roughly the same proportions of their knowledge. We illustrate the different learn-
ing processes with the example of gathering professional knowledge in medicine [3].
The basics for medical knowledge are taught by transmission in universities. The transmitted knowledge consists of task-
neutral biomedical information, which is mostly causal and deﬁnitional in nature and describes the functioning and possible
dysfunctioning of the human body [3]. It is this transmitted knowledge that upon elicitation would result in task-neutral
knowledge segments. Next, in internships, the students are confronted with real patients in a real hospital setting. They
now have to link the transmitted task-neutral information to actual clinical situations. In contrast to most biomedical knowl-
edge, the knowledge required to attend to real clinical problems is task-speciﬁc in nature. It consists of knowledge of symp-
toms, of differential diagnoses and how to construct them, and of treatments for diseases and how to weigh the beneﬁts and
risks of these treatments, all embedded in concrete medical situations [3]. In internships, some transmitted information is
still offered, but students are also acquiring knowledge by trying to ﬁgure out diagnoses and treatment plans themselves.
Accretion is also at work, continually recording information from all perception faculties. Examples of accreted knowledge
range from how to read symptoms from patients’ look, smell, utterances and behavior, to how to communicate with col-
leagues, patients and their next of kin, to how to get around in the hospital and many other aspects of work. All that is
learned is now embedded in the task at hand and in the medical culture and practices. In cognitive science terms, we say
that the knowledge is situated.
It is taking the step from employing task-neutral knowledge in college to having to apply task-speciﬁc knowledge in a
hospital setting that makes the transition from the university classrooms to practice so problematic for many medical stu-
dents [3]. Students may have learned which disease causes which symptoms, and maybe even have seen pictures of such
symptoms. However, recognizing the symptoms when exhibited by a patient is a very different matter. Each patient is un-
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Patients may further have more than one disease, which may result in an indistinct mixture of symptoms. And confusingly,
many early symptoms of severe illnesses can look like relatively innocent diseases. Last but not least, the reasoning required
now goes diagnostically from symptoms to disease, not causally from disease to symptoms. To allow its ready activation, the
knowledge involved needs to be re-represented in the brain. The issue of having to re-represent knowledge is supported by
research in various other contexts, from which it is also clear that switching information from one representation to another
is very difﬁcult. Switching representations, in fact, does not occur spontaneously and must be explicitly and extensively
taught [2,29].
Professional learning in medicine does not stop with the internship phase. It continues largely by a mixture of accretion
and acquisition during the entire career. All knowledge picked up in this phase is in a task-speciﬁc format, because it is
learned while carrying out speciﬁc tasks in the professional setting. In a physician, for example, interaction with patients
is typically stored as cases, which are exemplars of sick people complete with diagnosis, treatment plan, and outcomes.
The theory of situated learning describes this phenomenon and argues that learning as it normally occurs is a function of
the activity, context and culture in which it occurs [21,27]. In fact, the theory argues speciﬁcally that learning never occurs
in a task-, context-, and culture-neutral manner.1
4.3. Eliciting task-speciﬁc knowledge
From the above observations, we conclude that the bulk of the professional knowledge of an expert is stored in the brain
in a task- and domain-speciﬁc format. It is therefore reasonable to assume that most of the knowledge that comes to the fore
upon elicitation is task- and domain-speciﬁc. Of course an engineer can explicitly ask a domain expert to provide task-neu-
tral knowledge. If experience from practice is requested, however, the engineer is asking for extra information processing
from the expert: the expert has to relate his or her knowledge in a different way than is stored in the brain. This, as argued
in the example above of the medical students’ transition from textbook knowledge to diagnostic and treatment knowledge,
requires non-trivial effort, which, as it is to be done in real-time, will at least considerably slow down the elicitation. More
potentially damaging even is that asking people to relay knowledge in a way that requires them to reason about their stored
knowledge always increases the risk of introducing errors [8]. We conclude that, except for information that was transmitted
in a task-neutral fashion, it will be difﬁcult, time-consuming and error-prone to try to elicit task-neutral knowledge from
domain experts.
Two recent examples from our own research will serve as illustrations. As a ﬁrst example, when we asked experienced pig
veterinarians to supply us with average disease symptoms for pigs that were sick, most of them provided us with symptoms
belonging to one particular illness rather than a context-free average; some gave symptoms associated with a particular
group of closely related diseases such as infections of the respiratory tract. A likely explanation of what happened is that
the veterinarians called to mind a pig having a particular disease, of which they provided the symptoms: the veterinarians
unwittingly related our question to their daily practice, thereby situating it in the setting in which they had learned the re-
quested information, and consequently rendered their knowledge in the way it was stored. The veterinarians providing a few
more symptoms ostensibly generalized but actually were doing exactly what their colleagues did: they provided the symp-
toms of diseases encountered within the same differential diagnosis.
As a second example, we recall a knowledge-elicitation session where we asked a group of veterinary experts to reason
out loud about particular pig cases of which the clinical symptoms were described in terms of variables and values. When
asked what would happen to their assessment of the case when a particular symptom was changed from present to absent,
one of the participants asked, in earnest, how he could possibly change the symptoms of a pig. Very likely, the veterinary
expert had called the case to mind as a concrete pig for which he had to come to a diagnosis. Thinking in this task-related
setting, he could not imagine physically changing a pig’s symptoms, which is in reality of course indeed impossible.
5. Storing the elicited knowledge
Having established that it is rather unlikely that an engineer will elicit knowledge from a domain expert that is altogether
task-neutral, we now address how the elicited knowledge is best stored in an ontology. More speciﬁcally, we compare con-
structing a single uniﬁed task-neutral ontology that is free of task biases, with constructing multiple task-speciﬁc ontology
modules, and reject the former option in favor of the latter one. We then argue that a library-style organizational structure
for the ontology best supports the development of a suite of Bayesian networks with multiple tasks views.
5.1. A single uniﬁed ontology or multiple ontology modules
We begin by comparing capturing all elicited knowledge in a single uniﬁed task-neutral ontology, with modeling it in
multiple (mostly) task-speciﬁc ontology modules. For the construction of a single uniﬁed ontology, be it composed of1 According to this theory, the knowledge transmitted in medical school is also not task-neutral: the task is passing the exam. For our purpose, however, the
issue is that the knowledge is independent of speciﬁc medical tasks.
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internal consistency upon maintenance and extension. In spite of these advantages, however, we reject building a single
ontology. A uniﬁed ontology for a suite of Bayesian networks with multiple task model views is likely to become quite large
in size. Even if it is well organized and highly structured, its mere size will cause the knowledge engineers and the domain
experts to quickly lose track of its contents. Another argument against the construction of a single uniﬁed ontology is that it
may be much more difﬁcult to build multiple task model views from a single entity than from a collection of entities. Given
the stronger arguments against a uniﬁed ontology, we propose to construct multiple task-focused ontology modules.
Addressing the format of the ontology’s content, we note that there are quite strong arguments for storing knowledge in a
task-neutral fashion. For example, if a particular segment of the domain knowledge plays a role in multiple different tasks,
then storing it in a task-speciﬁc fashion would require capturing it multiple times, each time from a different perspective.
Storing the knowledge in a task-neutral fashion, on the other hand, would not need such duplication. Also, when new task
model views need to be developed, it is quite likely that these are already supported by the available task-neutral knowledge.
If the knowledge had been stored in a task-speciﬁc fashion, developing a new task-speciﬁc ontology module would be
required.
Although there are strong arguments for storing the elicited knowledge in a task-neutral fashion, it generally will be
infeasible to do so. In Section 4, we argued that the bulk of the elicited knowledge will be available in a format that is both
task- and domain-speciﬁc. Constructing a task-neutral ontology would thus require stripping the elicited knowledge from its
task biases and integrating the resulting segments of neutral knowledge. The task of stripping the elicited knowledge from its
task-speciﬁc context is non-trivial, however. In our opinion, it is even infeasible since not just the experts but also the engi-
neers will have particular tasks in mind when surveying the various segments of knowledge. The engineers moreover are
likely to be insufﬁciently knowledgeable in the domain of application to recognize the various included task biases. Although
storing knowledge in a task-neutral fashion is preferred, therefore, its infeasibility supports storing the bulk of elicited infor-
mation in a task-speciﬁc format.
We would like to note that although most of the elicited knowledge will be available in a task-speciﬁc fashion, some of it
may be task-neutral, for example if originating from the transmission phase of learning professional knowledge. Also, some
of the elicited information can be easily abstracted to create segments of task-neutral knowledge. An example of the latter
observation comes from one of our veterinary applications. Upon reviewing the knowledge involved in measuring a pig’s
body temperature, our veterinary practitioners mentioned that catching a pig will cause stress to the animal and thereby
raise its body temperature. The stress effects of catching a pig are not speciﬁc for the task for which it is being caught how-
ever, and hence are relevant for any task in which the animal is being handled. Some of the knowledge elicited in the con-
texts of the various tasks to be supported thus is explicitly reusable and can in fact be stored in the preferred task-neutral
format.
5.2. A library of ontology modules
Based upon the observations above, we envision capturing all elicited knowledge in an ontology composed of multiple
modules, most of which are domain- and task-speciﬁc and some of which are task-neutral. As an example we consider again
our application in oncology from earlier sections. Some of the modules of the ontology contain background knowledge that is
common to all tasks in the domain yet independent of a speciﬁc task. An example of such knowledge is anatomical knowl-
edge summarizing the structure and elements of the oesophagus and its neighboring organs in the human body. This knowl-
edge is common to most tasks in the domain yet is not speciﬁc for any task in particular. It would be stored therefore in one
or more task-neutral ontology modules. Other modules of the ontology contain knowledge that is common to one task but
holds across domains. The graphical structure from Fig. 1b pertaining to the interpretation of the results of diagnostic tests,
showed a segment of such knowledge. The majority of the modules, however, capture knowledge that is both task- and do-
main-speciﬁc. Knowledge of which test results are the strongest indicators for particular stages of the patient’s cancer for
example, is strongly linked to the task of diagnosis and would be included in a task-speciﬁc ontology module for diagnostic
tasks. Note that knowledge may have varying gradations of task speciﬁcity. For example, knowledge of when a patient for
which cancer stages can be subjected to curative treatment and when he should receive palliative care, is not just linked to
the choice of treatment but also to the task of prognostication. This segment of knowledge may thus be captured in more
than one task- and domain-speciﬁc module, possibly described from varied perspectives.
From the above observations, we have that the domain knowledge elicited for a suite of Bayesian networks is captured in
a collection of, mostly task- and domain-speciﬁc, ontology modules. To support the construction of multiple task model
views for the suite, we now envision storing these ontology modules in a library-style organizational structure. For devel-
oping a particular task model view, the knowledge engineer retrieves from this library the required modules and combines
them into a task-focused ontology to support the view. For example, to construct a concrete task-focused ontology for the
model view of teaching diagnostics for the domain of oesophageal cancer, the task-neutral modules of anatomical knowl-
edge would be selected as well as modules related to the tasks of diagnosis and prognostication; the modules of anatomy
and prognostication would be included in the task-focused ontology to serve both simulation purposes and answering in-
depth ‘what-if’ questions. Note that the other modules from the library need not be considered upon constructing the teach-
ing-view ontology. For supporting a model view of diagnostics for an attending oncologist, on the other hand, the knowledge
from the task-neutral modules of anatomy would most likely not be included explicitly in the task-focused ontology, as the
Fig. 4. A library-style ontology for developing task model views: the library of ontology modules is supplemented with a library of generic knowledge
structures and a document of modeling decisions; drawn arcs indicate instantiation of modules, dashed arcs indicate selection.
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predicting the effects of treatment is to be developed. Any task-neutral knowledge required for the newmodel view ideally is
already present in the library and can be pulled in. Also the ontology module of prognostication already present in the li-
brary, captures some of the knowledge for the new task and can be used. In addition, however, new task-speciﬁc modules
describing the physiological effects of treatment need to be developed and included. The knowledge for these new modules
needs to be elicited from domain experts, where the elicitation can focus on just the task at hand.
Fig. 4 sketches the basic idea of our library-style ontology for a suite of Bayesian networks. The top right part of the ﬁgure
depicts the collection of task-neutral and task- and domain-speciﬁc ontology modules. This collection of modules is the pool
of all elicited knowledge which constitutes the basis for developing different task model views for the suite. The top left part
of the ﬁgure depicts the meta-library of generic knowledge structures mentioned in the introduction and conveys the idea
that generic knowledge structures can be exploited to support capturing domain knowledge in ontology modules. The bot-
tom right part of the ﬁgure shows the collection of task model views for the suite of networks. These task model views are
constructed by selecting appropriate segments of knowledge from the library and combining these into a uniﬁed view. Upon
constructing the task model views typically many modeling and demarcation decisions are taken. The bottom left part of the
ﬁgure suggests that these decisions are also documented and maintained in the overall ontology.6. Concluding observations
In this position paper, we argued that multiple task model views for a suite of Bayesian networks are best supported by a
library-style ontology composed of mainly task- and domain-speciﬁc knowledge modules.
In posing our views, we addressed several issues. We began by reiterating the need of documenting all elicited knowl-
edge. If this knowledge is not properly documented, construction and maintenance of large suites of networks inevitably be-
come problematic. We recommended building an ontology to provide a well-structured explicit speciﬁcation of the elicited
knowledge and a medium for communication for the knowledge engineers and the experts involved in the networks’ devel-
opment. We argued that the ontology should not only store the knowledge needed for the different model views, but also
any relevant background knowledge. Documentation of the information that cannot be read off the suite of networks directly
is especially important when the development of the suite extends over several years of research and the suite ultimately is
handed off to industry. We also attended to the language to be used for our ontologies. The necessity of including all types of
relevant knowledge demands a language that has a rich semantics and permits semi-automated model building. We stressed
that the language used should be accessible for non-mathematical domain experts. Earlier research had shown that rigor-
ously formal representations, be they logic-based or stated in another mathematical language, cannot readily be understood
by domain experts who are not trained in such representations. When stated in a semi-formal language that is accessible for
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experts, which serves to minimize the risk of omitting important information and of including erroneous information.
Next, we argued for aligning the content of the ontology with how practicing experts learn and store knowledge in their
minds. Some knowledge, we argued, is stored in a task-neutral fashion, and should also be stored in this way in the ontology.
However, we contended that most knowledge of domain experts is inherently related to speciﬁc tasks and is stored in that
way in their brains. Constructing a task-neutral ontology would thus require stripping the task-speciﬁc professional knowl-
edge from its task biases. This, however, is highly demanding, either on the part of the expert or on the part of the knowledge
engineer, and error-prone. We therefore proposed storing task-speciﬁc knowledge in a task-speciﬁc fashion. Lastly, we pro-
posed to develop a library-style ontology, composed of the aforementioned task-neutral and task-speciﬁc knowledge mod-
ules which subsequently are combined into task-speciﬁc ontologies to support concrete task model views for a suite of
Bayesian networks. We illustrated the ease of development of multiple views and demonstrated that re-use of information
is encouraged by organizing the domain knowledge in modules.
In the near future, we intend to further develop our concept of an ontology library by using it in the development of a
suite of Bayesian networks in the ﬁeld of veterinary science. By doing so, we hope to initiate the distribution of a publicly
available collection of ontology modules and to inspire the uncertainty community to contribute.
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